With proxy season now upon us, we at Westlaw Business see it as our job
to inform you of the top issues raised in recent proxies, SEC
correspondence and other related documents. With difficult
economic conditions and increasing shareholder activism, this
year’s proxy statements require a degree of re-thinking not
seen for some time. To help you with that, we’ve
begun this series, covering must-haves in this season's proxies.
Are boardrooms suddenly thrown open to new board slates, removing
current boards? With declassification on the tip of so many tongues,
you might think so. Motivated by under-performing businesses,
under-water stock prices and over-protected boards, demand for board
declassification has grown. Surprisingly, the boards
themselves seem quite willing to go along with the move, claiming to be
singing from the good governance songsheet. In truth, these
moves may be intended to ease the way for premium-paying acquirors or
operations-improving activist shareholders. Regardless, companies
entering this year’s proxy season should consider this
dynamic and their role in it.
As background, a declassified board structure allows an annual voting
nomination process for the entire directorship. The ability
to simultaneously re-elect (or replace) the entire board can serve to
do two things: aid in hostile proxy battles leading to
director musical chairs; or allow shareholders to annually approve (or
disapprove) certain directors that may have performed worse (or better)
than expected. Stated otherwise, annual board re-elections
allow greater shareholder control over a company’s
operation. However, they also offer the
“tomato-tomAHto” events termed contested slates,
proxy contests, or “unlocking shareholder value”
(when voiced by shareholder activists).
Recently, shareholders frustrated by companies’
underperformance have been asking companies to remove their classified
structures and put in place a declassified, annually elected
board. While in years past this approach drew jeers from
entrenched board members, management has recently become much more
flexible in their willingness to listen. Some companies are
including shareholder proposals (or proposals directly from boards) in
their proxies asking for boards to be declassified – along
with a thumbs-up from the board. Other companies’
boards are more resistant, adding shareholder’s proposals to
the proxies, but with board’s asking for a no vote.
The SEC has joined the fray as well, making clear its supportive
position on this (so long as it’s done in the right ways).
The SEC’s stance comes through loud and clear from recent
comment letters advocating declassification where it’s
sought. Consider two examples: Fisher
Communications sought to exclude a declassification proposal based on
the grounds that the proposal would disqualify board members to
complete their terms. The SEC agreed with Fisher, but should
the proposal be revised to have the directors serve out their terms,
the company would have to include the proposal in its proxy.
Further, through staff comment letters, the SEC has asked companies to
clarify just what board declassification would entail. Grubb
& Ellis Co. responded to the SEC’s requests for more
detail by claiming its declassification would “champion a
platform of corporate governance best practices” and increase
responsiveness (from the directors) to the wishes of
shareholders.
In light of the SEC’s receptiveness, it’s perhaps
no surprise that certain, change-hungry boards have moved in the same
direction. Several have recently included, or formally adopted,
proposals asking for their boards to be declassified. Heavy equipment
manufacturer Deere & Co. claims the elimination of its
classified board will allow an increase in accountability to
shareholders. Medical equipment maker Becton
Dickinson’s board restated the company’s articles
of incorporation to allow for declassification.
3Com recently implemented the declassification proposal that its
shareholders had approved. In all cases, shareholders must
still approve the declassification move, which the company claims is to
the shareholder’s best interest. While all are cast
in the terms of willingness, it’s difficult to ascertain how
willing these moves actually are – protestations of
willingness notwithstanding, they sometimes smack of senior executives
leaving beloved jobs to “spend more time with their
family.”
Some boards object to declassification but opt for shareholder
democracy. When dealing with declassification proposals, they
let the votes at the annual meeting decide.
Homebuilder Toll Brothers’ recent proxy includes a proposal
from Amalgamated Bank’s LongView MidCap 400 Index Fund asking
to declassify the company’s board. Toll
Brother’s board recommends that shareholders vote against the
proposal, citing its classified board structure as able to
“engage in long-term strategic planning.”
Another such company, who has seen its share price halved in the past
52 weeks, is Analog Devices. The chip maker received an
individual shareholder proposal asking for board declassification
against the board’s ideals. The company solely
focuses on its board’s classified structure as a way to avoid
unwanted takeovers.
Declassification opens up a
company’s management to replacement. This can serve
to shake up boards or facilitate premium-paying hostile
acquirors. It may also allow companies to more easily replace
ineffective directors, along the way earning higher grades from those
measuring corporate governance (including all-important proxy
firms). Notwithstanding the implicit calls of
“…and don’t let the door hit you on your
way out,” boards are surprisingly amenable. With
this sort of move afoot, both the corporate action and its disclosure
should be under consideration today as a part of governance reviews.
Published: February 26, 2009